Secrecy, Public Relations and the British Nuclear Debate by Daniel Salisbury

Author:Daniel Salisbury [Salisbury, Daniel]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781000033335
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2020-02-06T00:00:00+00:00

Mounting tension towards the 1979 general election

Callaghan arrived in the midst of a political crisis on his return from Guadeloupe where he had made a secret and informal approach to Carter on Trident I C4. By the end of March his government would face a no confidence vote, and in May he would lose a general election to Thatcher. While the DEASC was continuing with its enquiry, which would ultimately be cut short by the election, awareness of the successor issue continued to increase. In Parliament, by early 1979, Labour ministers were being questioned on the issue once or twice a month.133 Increasingly, questions from MPs of both major parties raised the issue in the context of Labour’s manifesto commitment. In March, Malcolm Rifkind MP went as far as asking whether the government were “deliberately trying to stifle debate on this subject” because of internal party divisions.134 Days before Parliament was dissolved for the election, the government’s awkward position came under further scrutiny. Seemingly yielding to this pressure, Mulley conceded, “I could not say today that in no circumstances would I be in favour of moving towards a new generation”.135

At this time, Labour was writing its 1979 Manifesto in two parts: domestic and international. Nuclear issues were included in the latter. The group considering the international section of the manifesto included the ministerial group of Callaghan, Chancellor Denis Healey, Mulley and Owen, as well as future Labour leaders Michael Foot and John Smith.136 Foot had helped found CND two decades earlier, and would lead Labour with a unilateralist policy in the early 1980s. The Labour constitution suggested that this group would consult with the Cabinet and the National Executive Committee (NEC). A draft section of the manifesto created by the party International Department, dated 1 February 1979, included a variant of the 1974 commitment:

We continue to renounce any intention of moving towards the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons (such as the cruise missile) or to a successor to the Polaris nuclear force. We will seek the removal of American nuclear bases from Britain.137

However, a parallel drafting process on the nuclear issue was in progress behind closed doors in the ministerial group – crucially, excluding Foot. The ministerial group noted in early January that the nuclear issue, through SALT, the DEASC enquiry and the successor issue, would see a raised profile in the near future.138 The discussion record noted:

In some ways this was unfortunate, but it also suggested that although hitherto great secrecy had always surrounded the subject, there might now be advantage in having the matter discussed more publically. There was bound to be a major argument in the Labour Party and, on deciding on the outcome, public opinion could be of considerable importance.139

With this in mind, Mulley was tasked with preparing a formula for the 1979 manifesto, “on which it would be possible to take a firm stand”.140 By mid-January he had drafted a formula that did not state an explicit position, and avoided reference to the Polaris successor issue completely by name.

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